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Abstract— Part 23 aircraft operation, and in particular general 
aviation, is relatively unsafe when compared to other common 
forms of vehicle travel. Currently, there exists technologies that 
could increase safety statistics for these aircraft; however, the 
high burden and cost of performing the requisite safety critical 
certification processes for these systems limits their 
proliferation. For this reason, many entities, including the 
Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, and the US Air Force, 
are considering new options for certification for technologies 
which will improve aircraft safety.  Of particular interest, are 
low cost autopilot systems for general aviation aircraft, as these 
systems have the potential to positively and significantly affect 
safety statistics. This paper proposes new systems and 
techniques, leveraging run-time verification, for the assurance 
of general aviation autopilot systems, which would be used to 
supplement the current certification process and provide a 
viable path for near-term low-cost implementation. In addition, 
discussions on preliminary experimentation and building the 
assurance case for a system, based on these principles, is 
provided. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been 
interested in alternate certification strategies for small aircraft 
systems for several years.  The Agency recognizes that new 
technologies are available that could significantly increase 
safety.  However, many of these technologies are not being 
implemented or certified due to several barriers.  Some of 
these barriers include the certification burden of outdated 
regulations. The Small Aircraft Revitalization Act (SARA) 
of 2013 provides a framework to consider new certification 
options.  Of primary importance is reducing the certification 
burden for systems which will improve overall aircraft safety, 
which is consistent with the core purpose of the certification 
process.   
The most frequent causes of fatal mishaps that afflict small 
aircraft are: loss of control (LOC), controlled flight into 
terrain (CFIT), and component failure involving the power 
plant [1].  Of particular interest is LOC, which accounts for 
over 40% of the total fatal mishaps.  In many instances, LOC 
statistics—as well as CFIT statistics - which are due to spatial 
disorientation or pilot distraction - could be significantly 
improved with the addition of even very simple autopilot 
systems, such as a simple wing leveler.  In addition, there are 
other automatic aircraft systems which will be able to 
improve mishap rates in many other categories in the near 
future.  For instance, an automatic LOC prevention and 
recovery system could have a dramatic impact on safety of 
small aircraft.  This would also be true for a flight director or 
automatic ground collision avoidance system (Auto GCAS) 
or an automatic forced landing system (Auto FLS).  Even so, 
these systems will all require an integrated autopilot system 
to provide safety decision actuation in order to achieve the 
safety enhancements.  These facts have led researchers and 
regulators to conclude that inclusion of an integrated 
autopilot into small aircraft would provide and/or facilitate a 
significant increase in safety for this type of airplane.  
Autopilots can be found on some new small aircraft; 
however, due to current certification costs, the business case 
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is not favorable for development of low cost autopilots for 
the small aircraft retrofit market and many new lower cost 
aircraft.  For example, a simple 2 axis, rate based autopilot 
(that was state of the art 15 years ago) costs $20,000- $25,000 
to install on a simple Cessna C-182.  This high cost means 
that sometimes the hull value of the aircraft is less than the 
installed autopilot system.  Furthermore, modern attitude 
based autopilots are even more expensive and harder to 
justify on older retrofit aircraft. 
In response to this reality, the FAA is partnering with NASA, 
with the University of Tulsa and AFRL, to develop strategies 
to ease the certification burden for small aircraft autopilots in 
order to improve the business case for their inclusion in both 
existing aircraft and lower cost new aircraft.  One particular 
strategy for accomplishing this is to transfer the authority and 
certification burden to a simpler and standardized system that 
would monitor an autopilot during operation to assure that it 
could not direct unintended or unsafe actions.  This autopilot 
assurance system would observe both the input plane (aircraft 
state sensor inputs) and output plane (control commands) of 
the autopilot to determine if the aircraft is being directed into 
an unsafe or unrecoverable region of its state space.  If this is 
the case, the assurance system would disable the autopilot 
and return full control to the pilot-in-command in a condition 
which mitigates loss of control during this transition (See 
Figure 1).  Techniques to provably assure safety in this 
manner are currently being established based on work in the 
hybrid systems verification and run-time verification fields as 
well as being used during testing of experimental air and 
spacecraft control systems.  Therefore, confidence in this 
method of alternate certification is high; however, there 
remains a large amount of work that must be accomplished 
before certification authorities will have the data required to 
make decisions based on this alternate method of 
certification. 
 
2. ACRONYMS 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
Auto FLS Automatic Forced Landing System 
Auto GCAS Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance 
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain 
COTS Commercial off the Shelf 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
GA General Aviation 
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
LOC Loss of Control 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Admin. 
RTA Run Time Assurance 
ROA Region of Action 
ROR Region of Recovery 
SARA Small Aircraft Revitalization Act 
SOUP Software of Unknown Pedigree 
 
3. REVITALIZED CERTIFICATION FOR PART 23 
AIRCRAFT 
Part 23 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) details 
airworthiness standards for the certification of airplanes that 
fall within the normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter 
categories.  These categories consist of nearly all general 
aviation airplanes along with other small commuter aircraft.  
Therefore, when the United States Congress wanted to tackle 
the “overly prescriptive and outdated certification process 
[2]” for general aviation (GA) aircraft and systems, they 
passed H.R. 1848, The Small Aircraft Revitalization Act of 
2013, or SARA.  SARA provides the FAA the opportunity to 
reorganize the certification requirements for part 23 aircraft 
in order to streamline the approval of new technologies 
designed to improve safety.  In addition, SARA stipulates to 
remove prescriptive based certification requirements in favor 
of performance based regulations, thereby opening up 
untraditional methods to airplane certification. 
In this context, the FAA has been looking into alternate 
methods of certification which will continue to assure safety 
in small aircraft without the current, overly burdensome and 
expensive certification process.  This has led to collaboration 
with partners in government, academia, and industry in order 
to determine the best ways to solve this difficult issue.  In 
particular, the FAA has begun coordinating with NASA to 
develop alternate methods of certification for autopilot 
systems which could enable the largest increase to overall 
safety for GA aircraft. 
4. SMALL AIRCRAFT SAFETY STATISTICS 
At the heart of the issue that SARA and the FAA are trying 
to address is the relatively poor safety record of general 
 
Figure 1. Autopilot monitor and control switch 
strategy which may relieve certification burden for 
an autopilot 
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aviation travel compared to other common forms of 
transportation.  In the ten year period from 2001-2010, the 
average number of general aviation accidents was over 1600 
per year, with over 300 of those causing at least one fatality 
[3].  This produced over 550 fatalities per year on average or 
over 1.5 fatalities per day.  When adjusted for the number of 
general aviation flight hours flown during these years and 
assuming a conservative average velocity of 100 miles/hr. 
and average occupancy of 2 persons per vehicle, the fatality 
rate per personal mile traveled was over 11.6 fatalities per 
100 million personal miles traveled.  When comparing this 
rate to other common forms of transportation, the data reveal 
that GA pilots and occupants are over 11 times more likely to 
be killed per mile traveled compared to travel in a car.  This 
number increases to over 1100 times more likely when 
compared to commercial air travel.  Only when compared 
against travel in motorcycles, which is known to be one of 
the most dangerous forms of travel, does general aviation 
have an advantage in safety and this advantage is only by a 
factor of around 2.5 [4, 5]. 
 
 
Of these relatively large number of fatal accidents, over 60% 
can be attributed to three specific causes: loss of control 
(LOC), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and component 
failure of the power plant [1].  Of these 3 major causes, loss 
of control heavily dominates, being the cause of over 40% of 
the total fatal mishaps in general aviation.  Therefore, 
targeting solutions to these three major causes, with special 
emphasis on loss of control, would provide the largest 
contributions to increases in safety for GA aircraft. 
 
5. EFFECT OF AUTOPILOT INCLUSION AND 
AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS ON GA SAFETY 
Fortunately, automated systems are currently available which 
are able to have a major impact on fatality statistics of these 
three major causes.  Of immediate interest, loss of control and 
CFIT accidents caused by poor situational awareness 
produced by environmental, geographical, or time-of-day 
factors, we believe, could be significantly reduced by a 
simple altitude-hold/heading-hold autopilot system.  This is 
stated more specifically by the FAA General Aviation Joint 
Steering Committee’s (GAJSC) findings that “LOC accidents 
at night and in IMC would drop by 50 percent simply by 
installing autopilots in the more than 100,000 IFR capable 
GA airplanes [1]”.  However, increases in safety produced by 
autopilot inclusion are not limited to this class of accident. 
Other automated safety systems are available which would 
provide a significant increase in the safety for other accident 
categories as well.  For instance, automatic ground collision 
avoidance systems (Auto GCAS), have been developed and 
are being deployed on United States Air Force F-16s [6].  
These Auto GCAS systems may have the ability to reduce 
CFIT accidents by as much as 98% in military aircraft, and 
development of similar systems for GA aircraft is underway.  
In addition, systems to automatically avoid and/or recover 
from loss of control situations are being developed which, 
when applied to the GA regime, would have a dramatic 
impact in safety for all types of loss of control situations.  
Even fatalities from power plant failure could be significantly 
reduced with the inclusion of automatic forced landing 
systems (Auto FLS) or flight directors with energy 
management cues that provide the highest probability for a 
safe and successful emergency landing [7].  These Auto FLS 
systems are currently under development for commercial and 
general aviation category aircraft.  Each of these automatic 
safety systems could dramatically influence the safety 
statistics of GA aircraft in the future, but they all rely on an 
integrated autopilot (or flight director) system to actuate their 
automated decisions.  Therefore, not only would the inclusion 
of a low cost autopilot in a large number of GA aircraft 
immediately provide substantial increases in safety and 
decreases in the fatal accident rates, it would also allow for 
 
Figure 2. Comparing fatality rates in transportation 
categories per personal mile traveled. [3, 4, 5] 
 
Figure 3. Categorization of fatal GA accidents from 
the GAJSC [1] 
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more advanced automatic systems to be integrated providing 
even further safety enhancement. 
 
6. AUTOPILOT RUN-TIME CERTIFICATION 
STRATEGIES 
Currently, there exist low cost, off the shelf, advanced 
autopilots designed for the experimental market with a mixed 
track record of capability and performance. In addition to 
these low cost solutions, several companies have invested 
resources in creating more robust, commercially available 
autopilot options. These autopilot technologies, under a well-
defined set of operating conditions, perform safely and 
effectively. However, most of these systems have what is 
considered commercially off the shelf software (COTS) or 
software of unknown pedigree (SOUP), software that has 
been developed without investing the resources to ensure 
compliance with current FAA certification guidance 
(specifically, the airworthiness design criteria highlighted 
within the SAE ARP4761, ARP 4754A, and the RTCA DO-
178C standards). To address this concern, one approach 
would be to invest the significant time, resources, and 
funding required to create an autopilot that is Flight Critically 
rated “safe to fly”. However, the end product most likely 
would be cost prohibitive for private owners, rated for 
specific vehicle configurations, and limited in usability [8]. 
Another option could be to assume that these autopilot 
systems, from the certification perspective, are considered 
capable at a lower certification standard. This would assume 
that, without additional testing and inspection, the autopilot 
software may not be compliant with all FAA certification 
standards at the rated criticality level. For these types of 
systems, several military and civilian aviation documents 
have identified a notion of a real time monitor and failsafe 
switching system, referred to as Run Time Assurance (RTA), 
as a key component to enabling the certification of 
automated, increasingly autonomous, and highly complex 
systems that are either cost prohibitive or impossible to 
certify using the current standards or guidelines. 
Run Time Assurance 
RTA can be defined as a structured argument supported by 
evidence, justifying that a system is acceptably safe and 
secure, not through reliance on offline tests or verification 
methods, but through reliance on real time monitoring, 
prediction, and failsafe recovery mechanisms. As illustrated 
in Figure 5, a run time assurance system consists of at least 
three components: the untrusted (or lesser certified) 
component, a run time monitor or flight executive, and one 
or more recovery systems.  The untrusted component 
contains functional subcomponents, which may not be 
sufficiently reliable or sufficiently verified according to 
current development or certification standards. There may be 
multiple reasons for having such components in a system: 
under normal conditions, they can provide improved 
performance or operational efficiency for the system or 
enhance the user experience. In the case of a general aviation 
aircraft, a low cost autopilot could be considered the 
untrusted component.  The core idea that enables the use of 
such components in a system is the presence of a safe fallback 
mechanism that 1) reliably detects potential problems (the 
monitor or flight executive) and 2) invokes a recovery 
mechanism that can ensure safe operation of the system, 
possibly with reduced capabilities and performance. It is 
assumed that the RTA monitor and recovery systems are 
certified at the highest criticality level required for the total 
system to operate. For example, consider an RTA protected 
subsystem with a potential failure mode that has been 
determined to be highest risk, endangering human life or 
significant cost. This risk level would translate to the highest 
criticality level (referred to as level A critical for civilization 
aviation). For the RTA protected system, the corresponding 
processes, design approaches, and verification methods 
prescribed for level A critical software and hardware must 
apply to the Run Time Monitor, Switch, and Recovery 
System. 
The key advantage to a Run Time Assurance approach is that 
lower cost autopilot systems can be employed without costly 
certification, allowing only the behaviors that are protected 
by certified monitors and recovery systems. At the surface, 
this may seem concerning, allowing a system to function 
without exhaustive testing / analysis. However, such an 
inference relies on the assumption that current software 
systems are exhaustively tested and are without errors or 
defects, which is actually not the case. Rather, software is run 
through a series of quality steps, checklists, and verification 
practices that increase the implicit confidence of that code.  It 
is our claim that the functional capability that has been tested, 
examined, and proven safe in a particular context, can be 
argued as safe even if the underlying software has not been 
created using a design assurance process. Within this 
paradigm, a design approach called Assume-Guarantee 
Reasoning might provide the offline design considerations 
and formalisms necessary for articulating the allowable and 
certifiable behaviors of an advanced system by constraining 
behaviors to only what is safe or recoverable.    
 
Figure 4. USAF F-16 with integrated Auto GCAS 
[16] 
978-1-4673-7676-1/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE 
Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited  
CASE NUMBER 88ABW-2015-4093 
5
In 2013, AFRL started a Phase III Small Business project 
with Barron Associates Incorporated (BAI) to develop a Run 
Time Assurance framework for untrusted flight critical 
software within any control layer from mission planning to 
trajectory planning to inner loop control. Below are some 
design considerations that were noted within the program that 
may be applicable to a Run Time Assurance based 
certification paradigm for a low cost GA Autopilot system: 
(1) The controller need not be a total black box. The 
complete certification case is better suited with at least 
some evidence the controller is capable within a portion 
of the flight envelope under specific assumed operating 
conditions (i.e., assuming the GA autopilot is being fed 
reliable inertial and guidance inputs). Under these 
defined assumptions, the autopilot must be designed 
with an RTA mechanism in mind or the autopilot code 
must be instrumented to provide insight into the 
reasoning behind the calculations being made at real 
time.  
(2) The RTA framework can be implemented using multiple 
recovery or failsafe mechanisms, which cover differing 
areas of the operating envelope. Previous research 
limited the recovery controller to just one region of 
attraction (ROA) or region of recovery (ROR). This 
constraint made it difficult to justify a performance gain 
out of the advanced controller (or non-safety critical 
autopilot) since the performance was limited to one 
recovery system that was fully certified using 
conventional standards. A better approach would be to 
allow the untrusted code to operate under specific, tested 
conditions only if specific recovery mechanisms were in 
place to take over if the autopilot failed.  
(3) For the GA aircraft, if the autopilot fails during 
operation, the predominant recovery controller may be 
the pilot. However, much care has to be taken to ensure 
that either the pilot is capable of recovering the aircraft 
at the point of autopilot failure or that alternate means of 
recovery are in place, such as a deployable parachute 
system.  
(4) Each recovery region must have defined zones or safety 
regions that ensure proper timing for switching and 
recovery. BAI has defined these zones based on aircraft 
capability, ensuring that within the given time interval, 
the flight executive or RTA monitor has enough time to 
engage a recovery controller before the next time 
interval. 
7. HIGH LEVEL ASSURANCE CASE FOR SIMPLE 
RTA/AUTOPILOT SYSTEMS 
In what may be the most tractable near-term implementation 
of an RTA system which could provide benefit for general 
aviation aircraft, a COTS type non-safety-critical autopilot 
would be monitored by a configurable and certified RTA 
system.  The “recovery” controller (from Figure 5) for this 
implementation, would be the human pilot in command 
which is always allowed to control the aircraft as a result of 
the pilot training process.  So, in essence, the human pilot 
would be the certified backup to the uncertified autopilot. 
This setup, which will be referred to for the remainder of this 
section as a “Non-Critical Autopilot - Run Time Assured - 
with Manual Pilot Recovery” System (NCA-RTA-MPR), is 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 5. Generic Run Time Assurance Architecture 
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We agree that the most important component of a Run Time 
Assurance based certification approach may be the 
Assurance Case (or Safety Case) itself. Fundamentally, the 
overarching Run Time Assurance claim is that a subsystem, 
by itself, does not provide enough acceptable evidence to 
achieve the level of confidence required for the 
predetermined level of risk, but that, in combination with a 
higher confidence monitoring and recovery system, the entire 
system provides sufficient evidence to achieve the level of 
confidence required for the predetermined risk. Our goal is to 
provide a NCA-RTA-MPR system that will NOT REDUCE 
the confidence in an existing GA aircraft and will lay the 
framework for future safety and recovery systems that rely on 
an autopilot. The goal of these future systems is to actually 
INCREASE confidence in future GA, providing evidence to 
support the claim that aircraft will have a higher confidence 
of safety with the existence of these systems than without.  
However, this approach in many ways does not align with 
existing design and verification processes as prescribed in 
documents such as the SAE DO-178C standard.  It is assumed 
that the standard processes will be followed, where feasible, 
to achieve a sufficient level of confidence in a NCA-RTA-
MPR system. However, it is understood that the underlying 
assurance argument that governs such processes is implicit. 
Therefore, if any deviation to the existing standards is 
proposed, much care must be taken in constructing a new 
explicit argument and evidence to achieve the level of 
confidence desired.  To further illustrate this point, the 
following examples would need to be constructed to 
articulate the explicit high level arguments, sub-arguments, 
and required evidence which might support an NCA-RTA-
MPR assurance case. A complete and thorough assurance 
case is better suited for follow-on research and engineering 
efforts and is out of scope for this initial paper; however, the 
following is offered for example purposes. 
Argument 1. The pilot in command is responsible for the 
safety of the aircraft, including separation from 
other aircraft, ground avoidance, ATC compliance, 
weather avoidance, controllability, and general 
aviation “rules of the road.” 
    Required evidence:   
x The pilot in command has been trained to be 
responsible for these safety factors and is “certified” 
to command the aircraft. 
Argument 2. The autopilot system will only be able to 
be used under the authority of the pilot-in-
command. 
Sub-arguement a. The autopilot can only be engaged 
by the pilot in command. 
Sub-arguement b. The autopilot can be disengaged 
at any time by the pilot in command. 
    Required evidence:  
x The RTA system must be assured through 
appropriate safety-critical certification activities to 
enable autopilot control only through the input of 
the pilot in command and allow disengagement at 
any time by the pilot in command. 
Argument 3. The autopilot will not be allowed to operate 
in an unsafe or uncontrollable region of its flight 
state space. 
Sub-arguement a. If the aircraft is within the unsafe 
portion of its flight state space and under manual 
control of the pilot in command, the autopilot will 
not be allowed to be enabled. 
Sub-arguement b. If, while under autopilot control, 
the aircraft enters into the unsafe or uncontrollable 
region (whether due to aircraft failure, 
environmental anomaly, or other emergency or 
unknown reason), the autopilot will be disengaged. 
    Required evidence: 
x The RTA system must be assured through 
appropriate certification activities to be able to 
monitor aircraft state and disengage the autopilot if 
the state falls outside the safe region. 
x The aircraft must be assured to be safe and 
controllable within a pre-defined region of 
operation.  Any state space outside this safe region 
is considered unsafe for these purposes. 
Argument 4. The autopilot will not be allowed to cause 
loss of control or entry into an unsafe or 
uncontrollable region of the aircraft operating space. 
 
Figure 6.  Non-Critical Autopilot - Run Time 
Assured - with Manual Pilot Recovery 
(NCA-RTA-MPR) System 
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Sub-arguement a. If the aircraft is tending toward 
the unsafe region of operation, the RTA system will 
disengage the autopilot in a timely manner to allow 
for the pilot in command to accomplish an 
appropriate recovery action such that the aircraft 
never enters into the unsafe region of operation. 
    Required evidence: 
x The RTA system must be assured through 
appropriate certification activities to be able to 
monitor aircraft state and disengage the autopilot in 
time to allow for appropriate recovery actions to be 
performed by the pilot.  
x The pilot must be qualified and have the time needed 
to react and respond to the condition causing 
disengagement of the autopilot in order to keep the 
aircraft in the safe and controllable region of its 
operation space. 
More information and background on the construction and 
usage of assurance and safety cases can be found in Reinhart, 
et al [9]. 
8. RUN TIME ASSURANCE FOR GA AND SMALL 
UAV AUTOPILOTS: PRELIMINARY 
EXPERIMENTATION 
Experimentation and implementation of the systems and 
concepts advocated in this paper (that being of the NCA-
RTA-MPR system) is beginning to be applied at the NASA 
Armstrong Flight Research Center with support from the 
FAA and NASA.  Initial testing on small unmanned aircraft 
has already provided limited but successful results and 
proved the feasibility of testing both in simulation and on the 
small scale.  For these initial tests, a small UAV autopilot was 
driven by intentionally unreliable position data.  When the 
data source predictably failed, the vehicle would be sent into 
an out of control situation.  An RTA monitor was established 
that looked at the change in this position data from frame to 
frame.  When the monitor tripped pre-set values (limits), 
which indicated it was likely that the position solution was 
invalid, control was immediately switched from autopilot 
control to a backup controller (in this case, the human pilot). 
This limited example provided invaluable experience into the 
implementation of such a system.  For example, the need for 
comprehensive instrumentation of the RTA monitor for flight 
testing was found to be critical to understanding the behavior 
of the system.  For instance, due to the nature of the position 
data source, the RTA monitor was tripped multiple times 
during each flight test.  Having RTA switch from autopilot to 
pilot was such a trivial and regular event from a pilot 
perspective that accurate determination of who was 
controlling the aircraft was at times ambiguous.  This 
unexpected result was also seen in the USAF Automatic 
Ground Collision Avoidance System flight testing as the 
pilots thought they flew the recovery maneuver only to find 
out during post flight analysis that the Auto GCAS system 
actually initiated and flew the maneuver slightly before the 
pilot [6].  In addition, after experimentation with delaying the 
pilot alert of RTA switching, it was found that prompt and 
aggressive indications should be added to rapidly alert the 
pilot he was being transferred control. Each of these findings 
indicate the importance of the development effort that must 
be applied to the pilot vehicle interface for this type of 
system. 
Because of the small scale and limited safety risk of testing 
these small scale UAVs in highly controlled environments, 
making the safety case for their testing was rather 
straightforward.  However, testing of the NCA-RTA-MPR 
system on larger scale UAVs and manned general aviation 
aircraft is planned beginning in late 2015 continuing through 
2016.  On these test platforms, the safety assurance case will 
be a critical factor in determination of flight safety and thus 
the ability to perform the requisite testing.  It is thus 
envisioned that the results of this testing will be twofold, one 
being the design and implementation of the system itself, and 
the other being the process required to convince experimental 
airworthiness certification authorities at NASA and the FAA 
of the safety of the system and aircraft.  The results of both 
should provide much needed direction to the 
NASA/USAF/FAA group and the community at large. 
9. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As has been discussed, the development of the Run Time 
Assurance methodologies, to date, has been largely 
academic.  However, this group is interested in not only the 
theoretical basis but also early experimentation and 
implementation to uncover problems early in the 
development process.  In pursuing this theme, work has 
begun on identifying a candidate autopilot system considered 
for small GA aircraft to test the concepts presented in this 
paper. With this system, we plan on utilizing conventional 
but novel assume-guarantee reasoning techniques to abstract 
allowable and non-allowable behaviors from the candidate 
autopilot.  In addition, plans to identify and implement 
recovery mechanisms like pilot takeover, collision 
avoidance, etc., and instrument the candidate autopilot to 
monitor undesired behavior or behavior that induces an 
unsafe or unrecoverable condition are underway.   
After development, certification, and flight testing of the 
NCA-RTA-MPR system, other systems that are of interest to 
the community could be developed as well.  For instance, the 
FAA is interested in the concept of adaptive autopilots which 
can change their control properties based on changes to 
aircraft control or aerodynamics.  These types of autopilots 
are designed to provide controllability even in the event of a 
control surface failure and therefore may be highly desirable. 
However, certification of these highly complex systems has 
not been successfully accomplished to date, making them 
great candidates for certification under an RTA approach.  In 
addition, RTA acceptance could open up many further areas 
of research for autonomy in part 23 aircraft which could 
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increase safety and open up general aviation to a much larger 
percentage of the population. 
APPENDIX 
A. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Assurance Case – A structured argument, supported by 
documentation, which builds confidence of safety and 
security to an acceptable level within a particular context. 
The assurance case provides a means to structure the 
reasoning that engineers implicitly use to gain confidence 
that systems will work as expected. It also becomes a key 
element in the documentation of the system and provides a 
mapping to more detailed information. The concept of an 
assurance case has been derived from the safety case, a 
construct that has been used successfully in Europe for over 
a decade to document safety for nuclear power plants, 
transportation systems, automotive systems, and avionics 
systems. Much like a legal case presented in a courtroom, 
an assurance case requires arguments linking evidence with 
claims of conformance to dependability-related 
requirements. [10] Several certification standards and 
guidelines in the defense, transportation (aviation, 
automotive, rail), and healthcare domains now recommend 
and/or mandate the development of assurance cases for 
software-intensive systems [11, 12] 
Design Time – The period within a system lifecycle 
pertaining to all design, integration, verification and 
validation activities performed PRIOR to full rate 
production.  
Run Time – The period within a system lifecycle after 
deployment, fielding, or full rate production as opposed to 
referring to the system during the “design time” or design 
phase prior to full rate production.  
Run Time Assurance (RTA) - A structured argument 
supported by evidence, justifying that a system is 
acceptably safe and secure not through reliance on offline 
tests but through reliance on real time monitoring, 
prediction, and failsafe recovery. 
Run Time methods – Methods and techniques to monitor, 
diagnose, and evaluate pre-defined (at design time) 
constraints that always must hold. Other terms may refer to 
fault diagnosis, isolation, and recovery with the exception 
that FDI & R methods predominantly refer to off-nominal 
physical component failures and not necessarily to software 
based failures not previously identified at design time. 
Run Time Assurance Based Certification – The act of 
providing acceptable arguments and evidence that leads to 
the certification of a system that contains a design time 
uncertified subsystem.  The certification argument relies on 
additional, complementary subsystem components 
designed to monitor, interrupt, and recover from a failure 
from the uncertified subsystem component.  
Autopilot assurance – A structured argument, supported by 
evidence that an autopilot system is acceptably safe and 
secure within the specific operational context in which it 
was intended. 
Hybrid System Verification – The discipline and methods 
to verify Hybrid Systems, or systems that contain both 
discrete decisions and continuous dynamics.  
Assume-Guarantee Reasoning – A form of compositional 
proof, performed by systematically defining and verifying 
the pre-conditions (assumptions) and post-conditions 
(guarantees) that govern the interconnections between all 
subcomponents within a system [13, 14, 15]. 
Region of Attraction (ROA) – The region or multi-
dimensional constraint space that guarantees a system, 
given the initial conditions start within the ROA, will 
always remain within the ROA.  
Region of Recovery (ROR) – The region or multi-
dimensional constraint space that is defined by a Run Time 
Assurance recovery system, guaranteeing that once a 
transition from advanced control to recovery control 
occurs, the system will safely traverse from the failed state 
space to a less capable, certified controller’s region of 
attraction (ROA). 
(RTA) Untrusted or Uncertified Component – The 
software component within an RTA system not certified at 
the same criticality level that is required of the system as a 
whole (i.e., a software system being used within a safety 
critical application that has not been tested to current safety 
critical standards).  
(RTA) Recovery System – Set of transition and baseline 
components providing overall assurance that at any given 
time, the RTA protected system can recover from an 
untrusted component failure. 
(RTA) Baseline Component – Software component(s) 
certified to maintain RTA protected critical functions under 
specific and limited conditions using deterministic and 
reliable decision procedures. 
(RTA) Transition Component – Software component(s) 
certified to transition the system from any condition at 
which the untrusted component failed to an operating 
condition suitable for the baseline controller to engage. 
(RTA) Monitor & Switch – Certified run time executive that 
compares the untrusted component behavior with a set of 
known, acceptable constraints based on the assume-
guarantee contracts of each subcomponent interaction and 
behavior. The monitor determines, based on the violation 
of a constraint and the time required to recover, when to 
switch from the untrusted to recovery components. 
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(RTA) Instrumentation Considerations – The process by 
which an untrusted or uncertified component is designed 
with software instrumentation (i.e., software based triggers, 
outputs, or assertions) such that run time monitoring against 
pre-defined constraints can be performed.  
Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) – The maximum 
time a particular algorithm, compiled on the target 
platform, requires to perform all executions within a given 
period of time. 
REFERENCES  
[1]  General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) 
Loss of Control Work Group, "Approach and 
Landing Report," 2012. 
[2]  113th US Congress, "H.R. 1848," 2013. 
[3]  National Transportation Safety Board, "Preliminary 
Aviation Statistics, Data for years 2001-2010," 2013. 
[4]  U.S. Department of Transportation, "Fatality 
Reporting System Data for years 2001-2010," 2012. 
[5]  Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, "Traffic 
Safety Facts 2011, Data for years 2002-2011," 2011. 
[6]  D. E. Swihart, A. Barfield, E. Griffin, R. Lehmann, S. 
Whitcomb, B. Flynn, M. Skoog and K. Processor, 
"Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System 
Design, Integration, & Flight Test," IEEE Aerospace 
and Electronic Systems Magazine, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 
4-11, 2011.  
[7]  L. Hook and C. Tomlin, "Development of a “Where-
to-Land” Decision Function for an Expert Piloting 
Systems (EPS) in Man-rated Autonomous Air 
Vehicles," NASA NARI, 2013. 
[8]  J. Rushby, "New challenges in certification for 
aircraft software," in Proceedings of the ninth ACM 
international conference on Embedded software, 
2011.  
[9]  D. Reinhart, J. Knight and J. Rowanhill, "Current 
Practices in Constructing and Evaluating Assurances 
Cases with Applications to Aviation," NASA 
Technical Report, 2015. 
[10]  "Assurance Cases," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/dependability/tools/assuran
cecase/. [Accessed August 2015]. 
[11]  1st International Workshop on Assurance Cases for 
Software-Intensive Systems (ASSURE 2013).  
[12]  R. Hawkins, I. Habli and T. Kelly, "The Principles of 
Software Safety Assurance," Boston, 2013.  
[13]  K. L. McMillan, "Circular Compositional Reasoning 
about Liveness," Cadence Berkeley Labs, , Berkeley, 
CA, 1999. 
[14]  G. Frehse, Z. Han and B. Krogh, "Assume-Guarantee 
Reasoning for Hybrid I/O Autonomata by Over-
Approximation of Continuous Interaction," Decision 
and Control 2004, CDC 43rd IEEE Conference, vol. 
1, 2004.  
[15]  M. Huth and M. Ryan, Logic in Computer Science, 
Modelling and Reasoning about Systems, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
[16]  Photo by Jim Ross, "NASA Dryden Past Projects: 
Automatic Collision Avoidance Technology / Fighter 
Risk Reduction Project," 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/ACAT
_FRRP/. 
 
 
BIOGRAPHY 
Loyd R. Hook received a Ph.D. 
from the University of Oklahoma in 
Electrical and Computer 
Engineering in 2012. He is 
currently an assistant professor at 
the University of Tulsa in the 
Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Department and 
director of the TU Vehicle 
Autonomy and Intelligence Lab (TU 
VAIL). Previously, he worked for NASA’s Armstrong Flight 
Research Center where he served as principle investigator 
and flight test engineer primarily pursuing projects 
investigating and implementing automatic and autonomous 
air vehicle systems. His current research focus is the 
development of safety assured autonomous vehicle systems. 
Matthew A Clark is the Technical Area 
Lead for the verification and validation 
of autonomous control systems within 
the Autonomous Controls Branch, 
AFRL/RQQA. Mr. Clark started his 
career in the Air Force Research Lab in 
1998 supporting large scale aircraft 
component thermal, acoustic, and static 
combined environment structural 
testing. In 2000, 2010 respectively he 
received his Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree in Electrical 
Engineering from Wright State University in Dayton, OH. 
From 2000 to 2005, Mr. Clark worked as an industrial power 
and control engineer at Delphi Automotive, in Warren Ohio. 
In 2005, Mr. Clark returned to AFRL as Technical Area Lead 
for the combined environment structural testing facility. In 
2010, Mr. Clark served at the Air Force Material Command 
headquarters providing support for the test and evaluation 
infrastructure, strategic planning, and operational cyber 
security, receiving the Exemplary Civilian Service Award. In 
2011 he returned to the Air Force Research Laboratory to 
work on the verification and validation of autonomous 
control systems and applications. His research interests 
include verifiable intelligent control systems and Run Time 
Assurance of intelligent systems. 
David Sizoo earned both M.S. and B.S. degrees in Aerospace 
978-1-4673-7676-1/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE 
Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited  
CASE NUMBER 88ABW-2015-4093 
10 
Engineering from M.I.T.  He has been an Experimental Test 
Pilot and Human Factors Specialist with the FAA for 6 years.  
Prior to joining the FAA, his 23 year career spanned work in 
both the military and civilian sectors.  In the U.S. Air Force 
and at Gulfstream Aerospace he served as a Developmental 
Test Pilot on programs including the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter, F-16, and Gulfstream G-150.  His passion is 
General Aviation flying and he is currently leading research 
to bring advanced technology and safety enhancements to the 
aviation community. 
Mark A. Skoog works for NASA’s 
Armstrong Flight Research Center as 
the Principle Investigator for their 
Automatic Systems Project Office 
which leads the Center’s autonomy 
research.  He also leads the Collision 
Avoidance Technical Stewardship 
Group for the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness.  He 
graduated from California Polytechnic State University at 
San Luis Obispo.  Over the past 34 years he has supported 
numerous NASA and the Air Force fighter and UAV research 
efforts as well as initial flight test of the B-2.  Focus areas 
have included the integration of flight controls and avionics 
with high authority autopilots to automatically accomplish 
all phases of fighter combat missions.  More recently, much 
of his career has been in the development of full vehicle 
autonomy and automatic collision avoidance systems, for 
both ground and air. 
 
James Brady received a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from 
Wichita State University, a M.S. in Engineering from Kansas 
University, a MBA from Avila University and a Ph.D. from 
Ohio State University. He spent more than 25 years with 
Lucent Technologies Bell Laboratories where he supervised 
product engineering and system groups for military and 
space projects. In 2006 he joined the FAA as the Avionics and 
Electrical Systems Specialist in the Small Airplane 
Directorate 
